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Superfund and Tort Common Law: Why Courts 
Should Adopt a Contemporary Analytical 
Framework for Divisibility of Harm 
Joshua M. Greenberg 
The year is 1980.1 The Gordon family had owned their farm 
in Arvin, California for fifty years and never had any concerns 
about drinking water quality. Indeed, the Gordons had been 
pumping water from their private well without any issue for as 
long as Michael, father of four and husband to Susan, could re-
member since taking over the farm from his father some thirty 
years earlier. However, on the morning of November 17, Michael 
noticed that the water from the well had a peculiar scent to it, 
and tasted bitter and slightly metallic. Susan confirmed that the 
water tasted “funny,” and urged her husband to report the inci-
dent to the proper authorities. Concerned for the health of his 
family and thinking someone had tampered with the farm’s only 
source of drinking water, Michael called the local police depart-
ment and reported his concerns. After finding no evidence of 
 
  J.D. Candidate, 2019, University of Minnesota Law School. Thank you 
to everyone who provided ideas and feedback throughout the writing process, 
especially Professor Alexandra Klass, Professor Brad Clary, and Minnesota Law 
Review editors and staff. A special thank you to my family, especially my par-
ents, and to Taylor Mayhall for their love and support throughout law school 
and the writing process. Copyright © 2018 by Joshua M. Greenberg. 
 1. This fictionalized introductory narrative is based on the history of the 
Arvin Superfund Site, the place at issue in the seminal CERCLA divisibility 
case—Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 
599 (2009). For a summary of the historical background of the Arvin Superfund 
Site, see id. at 602–05 (discussing Brown and Bryant’s twenty-eight-year agri-
cultural chemical distribution operation at the Arvin Superfund Site and the 
toxic havoc that resulted thereafter); John C. Cruden, Acting Assistant Attorney 
Gen., Env’t & Nat. Res. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Speech Before the Environ-
mental Law Institute: The Supreme Court’s Decision in Burlington Northern & 
Santa Fe Railway Company v. United States (May 29, 2009) [hereinafter Cru-
den ELI Speech], https://www.justice.gov/enrd/acting-aag-john-cruden-s 
-remarks-burlington-northern-santa-fe-railway-co. See infra Part I.C for a more 
detailed discussion of the Burlington Northern saga. 
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trespass or wrongdoing, the police referred the matter to the Cal-
ifornia Department of Toxic Substances Control (CDTSC) to de-
termine the extent of the contamination. 
The Gordon family was not the first landowner in the area 
to report potentially contaminated drinking water, and they 
would not be the last. As other landowners with private wells 
continued to intermittently complain about bitter-tasting water 
for the next three years, CDTSC began to connect the dots. Dur-
ing their investigation of numerous private wells, CDTSC deter-
mined that there was toxic pesticide contamination in the 
groundwater and contacted the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) for assistance in finding the source of the contam-
ination. In 1983, CDTSC and EPA began investigating the Arvin 
Plant in Arvin, CA—home to Brown & Bryant, Inc. (B & B), an 
agricultural chemical distribution company.2 The most noticea-
ble thing about the Arvin Plant was the odor. The acrid stench 
of chemicals permeated the entire grounds of the nearly thir-
teen-acre facility.3 Along the walls of the main warehouse were 
massive bulk storage tanks each the size of a standard sedan; 
countless barrels housing a multitude of different pesticides 
were precariously stacked one on top of the other. 
A brownish-red chemical, the source of the odor, leaked from 
many of the barrels and bulk storage tanks onto the concrete 
floor, as haphazardly placed buckets overflowed and failed to 
contain the errant liquid. B & B employees periodically sprayed 
down the warehouse floor and other equipment, washing away 
the toxic pesticides into the surrounding soil and nearby unlined 
drainage pond, eventually contaminating the groundwater be-
neath the Arvin Plant.4 EPA and CDTSC were particularly con-
cerned about toxic threats to neighboring drinking water sup-
plies, as the “plume of contaminated ground water located under 
the facility . . . threatened to leach into an adjacent supply of po-
tential drinking water.”5 
In cooperation with EPA and CDTSC, B & B “undertook 
some efforts at remediation,”6 but discontinued all operations in 
 
 2. Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 604. 
 3. “B & B opened its business on a 3.8-acre parcel of former farmland in 
Arvin, California, and in 1975, expanded operations onto an adjacent 0.9-acre 
parcel of land . . . .” Id. at 602–03. The Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway 
Company and the Union Pacific Railroad Company (the Railroads) jointly 
owned the 0.9-acre parcel and leased it to B & B. See id. at 603, 606. 
 4. Id. at 603. 
 5. Id. at 604; see also Cruden ELI Speech, supra note 1. 
 6. Remedial actions address the release of hazardous substances through 
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1989 due to insolvency.7 EPA, pursuant to its authority under 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act (CERCLA)8 and in cooperation with CDTSC, 
began cleanup activities at the Arvin facility that same year.9 
B & B would normally be responsible for funding federal cleanup 
activities as owner of the facility.10 However, nearly ten years 
after B & B declared bankruptcy, EPA sued the Burlington 
Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company and the Union Pacific 
Railway Company (the Railroads), joint owners of part of the 
property, to recover the government’s expended cleanup costs.11 
Under CERCLA case law that existed at that time and absent a 
showing of divisibility,12 the Railroads most likely would have 
been held jointly and severally liable for all of the governmental 
response costs towards remediating the soil and groundwater 
contamination at the Arvin facility, despite the fact that B & B 
was directly responsible for the contamination. 
 
emphasizing permanent cleanup solutions. Remedial actions are often con-
trasted with removal actions, which are short-term solutions that address the 
release of hazardous substances requiring a prompt response. See, e.g., 42 
U.S.C. § 9601(23)–(24) (2012); Superfund: CERCLA Overview, EPA, https:// 
www.epa.gov/superfund/superfund-cercla-overview (last visited Oct. 31, 2018). 
 7. Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 605. 
 8. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability 
Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–75, more commonly called Superfund, estab-
lishes the framework for how the government addresses threats to “human 
health or the environment resulting from releases or potential releases of haz-
ardous substances from abandoned or uncontrolled hazardous waste sites.” See 
TECH. INNOVATION OFFICE, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, 
EPA, CERCLA/SUPERFUND ORIENTATION MANUAL, at I-1 (1992) [hereinafter 
SUPERFUND ORIENTATION MANUAL], https://semspub.epa.gov/work/11/174484 
.pdf. This Note uses the terms CERCLA and Superfund interchangeably. 
 9. Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 605. 
 10. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). 
 11. Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 605. 
 12. The legislative history of CERCLA indicates, and subsequent litigation 
confirms, that Congress intended CERCLA liability to be governed by evolving 
principles of federal common law. See infra Part I.A. Under the common law of 
torts, a party otherwise jointly and severally liable may limit their liability by 
showing that the harm in question is divisible, or capable of being apportioned 
to multiple causes. In the CERCLA arena, courts apply the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts and ask whether “there is a reasonable basis for determining the 
contribution of each cause to a single harm.” Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 614 
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1965)). 
See also infra Part II.A for a more detailed discussion on how courts have ap-
plied divisibility post-Burlington Northern. 
  
1002 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:999 
 
However, in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. 
v. United States,13 the Supreme Court held that the harm14 at 
the Arvin facility was divisible, and apportioned the Railroads’ 
share to nine percent, leaving the remaining financial burden on 
the federal government and other parties that undertook 
cleanup efforts voluntarily.15 Remediation efforts at the Arvin 
Superfund16 Site to date, including groundwater treatment and 
soil capping,17 have been largely successful at reducing the risk 
of potential exposure to contaminants18 and the Railroads, who 
were not directly responsible for the contamination, were able to 
avoid paying more than their fair share of the cleanup costs by 
asserting a divisibility defense. 
 
 13. 556 U.S. at 600. 
 14. To further complicate an already complicated analysis, courts have 
struggled to define “harm” in a CERCLA context. See, e.g., Steve C. Gold, Dis-
Jointed? Several Approaches to Divisibility After Burlington Northern, 11 VT. J. 
ENVTL. L. 307, 315 (2009) (citing O’Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 180 (1st Cir. 
1989)). The court in O’Neil “express[ed] doubt as to whether ‘harm,’ for divisi-
bility purposes, consists of response costs, of environmental contamination that 
actually occurred, or of environmental contamination averted by response ac-
tion.” Id. at 315 n.35; see also United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. 
Co., 520 F.3d 918, 938–39 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 556 U.S. 599 (2009) (outlining 
different approaches for interpreting “harm” within the CERCLA context). 
 15. The district court held that the Railroads’ liability was limited to “9% 
of the total Site CERCLA response costs including interest and attorneys’ fees” 
based on geographic, temporal, and volumetric/toxicity factors. United States v. 
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., No. CV-F-92-5068 OWW, No. CV-F-96-6226 
OWW, No. CV-F-96-6228 OWW, 2003 WL 25518047, at *91 (E.D. Cal. July 15, 
2003). On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district 
court’s finding that there was a reasonable basis for apportioning the Railroads’ 
liability, holding the Railroads jointly and severally liable. Burlington N., 520 
F.3d at 946. The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the Ninth Circuit and up-
held the district court’s original finding of divisibility for the Railroads. Burling-
ton N., 556 U.S. at 619. 
 16. “Superfund” is often informally used to refer to CERCLA. What Is Su-
perfund?, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/superfund/what-superfund (last visited 
Oct. 31, 2018). Superfund can also refer to the Superfund Trust Fund, a fund 
used by the government to pay for cleanup activities. See 26 U.S.C. § 9507 
(2012); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(11) (2012); SUPERFUND ORIENTATION MANUAL, supra 
note 8, at II-1 to II-2.  
 17. Soil capping does not destroy or remove hazardous contaminants, but 
rather, involves placing a protective cover over contaminated soil to isolate the 
contamination at issue. See OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, 
EPA, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO CAPPING 1 (2012), https://semspub.epa.gov/work/ 
HQ/158704.pdf. Caps can range in complexity from a single layer of asphalt 
aimed at isolating low-level contamination to multiple-layer caps of different 
materials for more hazardous sites. See id.  
 18. See Superfund Site: Brown & Bryant, Inc. (Arvin Plant), Arvin, CA 
Cleanup Activities, EPA, https://cumulis.epa.gov/supercpad/SiteProfiles/index 
.cfm?fuseaction=second.Cleanup&id=0901425 (last visited Oct. 31, 2018). 
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However, in contrast to the outcome in Burlington Northern, 
the vast majority of parties found liable under CERCLA are not 
successful in invoking a divisibility defense to limit their finan-
cial contributions towards reimbursement of cleanup costs.19 De-
fendants found liable to the government or another private party 
for cost recovery can bring a claim for contribution under CER-
CLA Section 113, which allows the court to consider equitable 
factors in allocating liability.20 However, where a Section 113 
suit is not available to a defendant because other potentially li-
able parties are not financially viable, unable to be located, or 
have resolved their liability with the government through a set-
tlement,21 that defendant’s only option for limiting its liability is 
to prove that the harm in question is divisible using causation 
principles.22 Whereas holding a defendant liable for the cost of 
an entire cleanup is fair and reasonable when that party was a 
direct cause of a substantial portion of the contamination, par-
ties that are less culpable (such as the Railroads in Burlington 
Northern) are often left paying more than their fair share of 
cleanup costs.23 
This Note surveys the landscape of CERCLA cases dealing 
with apportionment of harm and argues that divisibility de-
fenses have been largely unsuccessful because of the courts’ re-
liance on the Restatement (Second) of Torts and the high eviden-
tiary bar to prove a “reasonable basis for apportionment.” It 
further argues that because Congress intended CERCLA’s lia-
bility scheme to be governed by the evolving principles of com-
mon law, and because states have been moving away from joint 
and several liability, courts should adopt the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts in analyzing whether harm can be apportioned. 
The Restatement (Third) of Torts differs from the Restatement 
(Second) in that the former reflects the states’ general shift away 
from joint and several liability schemes by being more receptive 
to divisibility arguments, allowing for apportionment where a 
 
 19. See infra notes 131–34 and accompanying text. 
 20. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f ) (1); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 
U.S. 157, 160–61 (2004) (holding that Section 113 contribution claims are only 
available to parties that have been found liable under Section 107); infra notes 
83, 146 and accompanying text for more discussion on the differences between 
apportionment under Section 107 and allocation under Section 113. 
 21. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f ) (2) (“A person who has resolved its liability to 
the . . . [government] in an administrative or judicially approved settlement 
shall not be liable for claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in 
the settlement.”). 
 22. See infra Part I.B. 
 23. See, e.g., infra Part II.A.2; see also infra Appendix. 
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party can prove that it is liable for “less than the entire amount 
of damages.”24 Further, the Restatement (Third) uses a two-step 
process for apportionment of liability in an effort to effectuate 
the policy that defendants should not be responsible for damages 
that they did not cause—a rule that better reflects the current 
state of common law and statutory tort law in the states.25 
Part I contextualizes CERCLA, describes how liability un-
der the statute works in practice, and discusses Burlington 
Northern in detail. Part II discusses how courts before and after 
Burlington Northern have been relatively consistent in analyz-
ing divisibility defenses under the Restatement (Second), how 
those approaches lag behind the rest of tort law doctrine in the 
states, and how the current state of affairs is best reflected in 
the Restatement (Third). Part III argues that to better align 
CERCLA divisibility practice with the development of state tort 
law, courts should adopt the Restatement (Third) of Torts in an-
alyzing divisibility of harm in Superfund cases. This Note con-
cludes that the current practice of presumptive joint and several 
liability under the Restatement (Second) in CERCLA actions is 
outdated and that it should be updated to better reflect the more 
prevalent rule of comparative responsibility. 
I.  CERCLA LIABILITY IN CONTEXT   
To better understand why the analytical framework for di-
visibility analyses should be updated, it is important to establish 
how and why the CERCLA liability scheme came about in the 
first place. Section A discusses Congress’s motivations in creat-
ing CERCLA and how inopportune timing forced the House and 
Senate to compromise on the final law. Section B discusses how 
CERCLA works in practice, with a specific focus on its liability 
provisions and divisibility of harm, using the first seminal CER-
CLA case as an example. Section C discusses the Burlington 
Northern saga in detail, focusing on the factual determinations 
made by the district court, eventually resulting in the U.S. Su-
preme Court upholding the Railroads’ divisibility defense. 
 
 24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 26 cmt. a 
(AM. LAW INST. 2000); Michael Foy, Apportioning Cleanup Costs in the New Era 
of Joint and Several CERCLA Liability, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 625, 648 n.172 
(2011). 
 25. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 26 cmt. d. 
  
2018] SUPERFUND & TORT COMMON LAW 1005 
 
A. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING CERCLA’S ENACTMENT 
AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
The primary motivation behind enacting CERCLA was the 
“highly publicized Love Canal tragedy,” which cost the American 
public $27 million in cleanup costs by 1980.26 At the time, “Love 
Canal [was] one of the most appalling environmental tragedies 
in American history.”27 From the early 1920s until 1953, the 
Love Canal site in Niagara Falls, New York was used as a chem-
ical dumpsite for municipal and industrial waste by the Hooker 
Chemical Company.28 In the late 1950s, after the dumpsite was 
filled in and sold to the City of Niagara Falls, NY, a public school 
and approximately 100 family homes were built over the site.29 
As the years passed, “82 different compounds, 11 of them sus-
pected carcinogens,” percolated through the soil as drum con-
tainers rotted and leached their contents into the areas sur-
rounding the homes and public school.30 By the late 1970s, the 
environmental havoc was evident—“trees and gardens were 
turning black and dying[,] . . . [p]uddles of noxious substances 
were in [residents’] yards . . . [and] basements . . . . Everywhere 
the air had a faint, choking smell.”31 In the immediate aftermath 
of the Love Canal tragedy, the State of New York bought out all 
of the homes affected by the contamination.32 President Jimmy 
Carter “approved emergency financial aid for the Love Canal 
area.”33 Although EPA had begun to address toxic pollution 
through a variety of other legal frameworks,34 the question of 
who should be held liable for previously disposed-of hazardous 
 
 26. J.P. Sean Maloney, A Legislative History of Liability Under CERCLA, 
16 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 517, 517 (1992) (citing Frank P. Grad, A Legislative 
History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Lia-
bility (“Superfund”) Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1982)). 
 27. Eckardt C. Beck, The Love Canal Tragedy, EPA J., Jan. 1979, at 17. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. The chemical leaching resulted from the landfill site exploding, as 
record amounts of rainfall triggered the explosion. Id. 
 31. Id. Other consequences of the toxic contamination at Love Canal in-
cluded a “disturbingly high rate of miscarriages” and birth defects. Id. 
 32. Id. at 18. 
 33. Id. The appropriation of emergency federal funds for Love Canal was 
the first in American history to be approved “for something other than a ‘natu-
ral’ disaster.” Id. 
 34. “The Clean Air and Water Acts, the Safe Drinking Water Act, the Pes-
ticide Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, [and] the Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act” are all “essential links” in addressing the problem of haz-
ardous waste. Id. 
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substances remained unanswered until 1980 when CERCLA 
was enacted.35 
Congress’s ultimate comprehensive cleanup scheme, known 
as CERCLA, or Superfund, resulted from many compromises in 
the legislature, which are reflected in the somewhat vague lia-
bility provisions of CERCLA,36 as the law was “hastily passed in 
the waning days of the lame duck session of the 96th Con-
gress.”37 Three bills, H.R. 85,38 H.R. 7020,39 and S. 148040 even-
tually became part of the Superfund law.41 
H.R. 85 was originally titled the “Oil Pollution Liability and 
Compensation Act,” and “as amended, included provisions for a 
comprehensive system of liability and compensation for oil spill 
damage and removal costs.”42 This system of liability, while lim-
ited to damage from oil spills, provided that “with certain limits 
and defenses, operators or owners of vessels or facilities were to 
be ‘jointly, severally and strictly liable for all damages.’”43 There 
was little debate on the House floor regarding H.R. 85 and on 
September 19, 1980, the House passed it and sent the bill to the 
Senate.44 Eventually, some provisions of H.R. 85 unrelated to li-
ability “became incorporated into the final Senate Superfund 
bill.”45 
The next bill incorporated into CERCLA was H.R. 7020,46 
which was originally introduced as an amendment to the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).47 Because the 
 
 35. See id. 
 36. CERCLA’s main liability provision, Section 107, states that Potentially 
Responsible Parties (PRPs) “‘shall be liable’ for cleanup costs, leaving unclear 
the standard of liability it imposes.” Maloney, supra note 26, at 518; see also 42 
U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2012). For a more detailed discussion of how CERCLA’s liabil-
ity provisions work in practice, see infra Part I.B. 
 37. Maloney, supra note 26, at 519. 
 38. H.R. 85, 96th Cong. (1979). 
 39. H.R. 7020, 96th Cong. (1980). 
 40. S. 1480, 96th Cong. (1979). 
 41. Maloney, supra note 26, at 518. 
 42. Id. at 519 (citing Grad, supra note 26, at 3). 
 43. Id. (quoting Grad, supra note 26, at 3); see also H.R. 85, 96th Cong. 
§ 104, 126 CONG. REC. H9187 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1980). 
 44. Maloney, supra note 26, at 520. 
 45. Id. Among the provisions of H.R. 85 that were incorporated were those 
including the concept of government response authority for releases of hazard-
ous substances that were not hazardous wastes (not including oil). See Grad, 
supra note 26, at 31. 
 46. Maloney, supra note 26, at 521 (citing 126 CONG. REC. H26,336). 
 47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–92 (2012). RCRA “was passed by Congress in 1976 to 
compel responsible parties, including the United States, to dispose of toxic 
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scope of H.R. 7020 was initially rather limited,48 the House de-
bate focused on making the liability provisions of the bill more 
stringent.49 
In particular, Congressman Al Gore proposed two amend-
ments aimed at making the bill’s liability standard strict liabil-
ity and requiring divisibility to be proven by a preponderance of 
the evidence.50 Congressman Gore and others believed that H.R. 
7020’s liability provisions were particularly deficient and the two 
amendments were offered to “insure that those companies and 
individuals who [were] responsible for . . . hazardous waste prob-
lems [would] bear their share of the cleanup cost burden.”51 The 
first amendment removed the incentive and ability for parties to 
contract away liability, and also insured that a negligent defend-
ant could not escape liability, even if the harm resulted from un-
related third-party actions.52 This made H.R. 7020’s liability 
standard strict liability.53 The second amendment focused on 
joint and several liability and aimed to limit the apparent loop-
holes in the original liability scheme of H.R. 7020 by requiring 
defendants to prove apportionability by a preponderance of the 
evidence—a move that brought H.R. 7020 closer to the common 
law principles of apportionment of harm.54 The House, viewing 
the strict liability and apportionment provisions of the Gore 
Amendments as consistent with CERCLA’s purpose, adopted the 
amendments, passed H.R. 7020, and sent the bill to the Senate 
on September 23, 1980.55 
 
wastes in an environmentally sound manner.” Maloney, supra note 26, at 521 
n.20 (citing Roger W. Andersen, The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 
1976: Closing the Gap, 3 WIS. L. REV. 635, 636–37 (1978)). 
 48. The original bill did not apply to hazardous waste caused by oil or pol-
lution in navigable waters and instead focused on inventory and cleanup of “in-
active waste disposal sites.” Id. 
 49. Most supporters of H.R. 7020 were in favor of “stricter liability provi-
sions” that allowed for EPA’s rapid recovery of expended cleanup costs. Malo-
ney, supra note 26, at 522 (citing 126 CONG. REC. H26,339–40 (daily ed. Sept. 
19, 1980) (memorandum of Rep. Staggers (D-W. Va.))). 
 50. See id. at 525–28. 
 51. See id. at 523 (quoting 126 CONG. REC. H26,781 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 
1980) (statement of Rep. Gore (D-Tenn.))). 
 52. Id. at 525. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 526–28 (citing 126 CONG. REC. H26,784–85 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 
1980) (statement of Rep. Gore (D-Tenn.))). 
 55. Id. at 529. (citing 126 CONG. REC. H26,788, H26,798 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 
1980)). 
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The final bill incorporated into CERCLA was S. 1480, origi-
nally titled the “Environmental Emergency Response Act.”56 The 
1980 Presidential Election, however, significantly altered the fi-
nal version of CERCLA that was eventually enacted because the 
election resulted in a lame duck session of Congress.57 Given the 
tight deadline and pressures created by an outgoing Congress, 
only the compromise agreement proposed by Senators Robert 
Stafford and Jennings Randolph had a chance of passing both 
houses.58 The Stafford-Randolph compromise was introduced as 
an amendment to the original S. 1480, which in effect, created 
an entirely new bill drawing inspiration from its predecessors.59 
According to the bill’s supporters, the amended S. 1480 in-
corporated the best provisions of the three other bills and elimi-
nated the more controversial provisions.60 Specifically, the 
amended S. 1480 retained a strict liability standard61 but elimi-
nated any reference to joint and several liability—instead, the 
bill relied on “common law principles” to determine when defend-
ants should be held jointly and severally liable.62 Congress an-
ticipated that relying on such principles for determining liability 
would result in “extensive litigation.”63 While some viewed the 
 
 56. Id. at 530 (citing S. 1480, 96th Cong. (1980), 126 CONG. REC. S30,897 
(daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980)). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 531. 
 60. Id. at 533 (quoting 126 CONG. REC. S30,935 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) 
(statement of Sen. Stafford (R-Vt.))) (“Fundamentally, [my compromise] amend-
ment 2623 is a combination of the best of the three other bills [H.R. 85, H.R. 
7020, and S. 1480], and an elimination of the worst, or at least the most contro-
versial [provisions] . . . .”). 
 61. The Stafford-Randolph compromise bill kept the strict liability stand-
ard by specifying that liability under CERCLA should be construed to be the 
same as Section 311 of the Clean Water Act. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (2012). That 
section of the Clean Water Act provides that when an “owner or operator of [a] 
vessel from which oil or a hazardous substance is discharged in violation of 
[§ 1321(b)(3)] . . . [he shall] be liable to . . . [the government] for the actual 
[cleanup costs].” 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f ) (1) (2012). Early courts relied on this refer-
ence to the Clean Water Act to determine that liability under CERCLA Section 
107 was strict. See, e.g., United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 
823, 844 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1114 
(D.N.J. 1983); City of Philadelphia v. Stephen Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 
1140 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1982). 
 62. Maloney, supra note 26, at 532 (quoting 126 CONG. REC. S30,932 (daily 
ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph (D-W. Va.))). 
 63. Id. at 532–33 (quoting 126 CONG. REC. S30,932 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) 
(statement of Sen. Randolph (D-W. Va.))). 
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amended S. 1480 “as gutting a progressive environmental bill,”64 
the Senate passed the Stafford-Randolph compromise in the 
waning days of the outgoing 96th Congress.65 However, because 
Superfund “was in part a revenue measure . . . it was necessary 
to treat it as if it had formally been initiated in the House.”66 
Thus, in considering H.R. 7020, the Senate “substituted and in-
corporated” the Stafford-Randolph compromise, passed it by a 
voice vote, and sent it to the House for final consideration.67 
The House considered the amended H.R. 7020 on December 
3, 1980.68 While some members of Congress were reluctant to 
pass the Senate version of the bill,69 others were in favor of pass-
ing a flawed bill because “they felt that . . . legislative action was 
necessary,”70 and that any delay in passing the Stafford-Ran-
dolph compromise bill would only “prolong the overall danger 
that the public ha[d] been exposed to already.”71 Thus, motivated 
in part by the strongly held belief that something had to be done 
to hold polluters financially responsible for cleaning up hazard-
ous contamination, the House approved the bill by a relatively 
wide margin.72 President Carter then signed the Superfund bill, 
putting it into effect on December 11, 1980.73 CERCLA’s liability 
provisions are facially ambiguous and only provide that covered 
persons “shall be liable,” without specifying a standard of liabil-
ity.74 However, the legislative history indicates that the scope of 
 
 64. Id. at 533. 
 65. Id. at 533–34. 
 66. Id. at 536. 
 67. Id. (citing 126 CONG. REC. S30,987 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980)). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Congressman James Broyhill, for example, was concerned that there 
were “dozens of defects” and that the liability provisions of the bill were uncer-
tain. Id. at 539 (citing 126 CONG. REC. H31,969 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (state-
ment of Rep. Broyhill (D-N.C.))). 
 70. Congressman Mario Biaggi, for example, argued that any further back-
and-forth between the Senate and the House of Representatives concerning ad-
ditional changes to the bill would likely result in no legislation being enacted 
until the following session. Id. at 540 (citing 126 CONG. REC. H31,974 (daily ed. 
Dec. 3, 1980) (statement of Rep. Biaggi (D-N.Y.))). 
 71. Id. (quoting 126 CONG. REC. H31,973 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (statement 
of Rep. Vento (D-Minn.))). 
 72. The final vote was “274 in favor, 94 against and 64 not voting.” Id. at 
541 (citing 126 CONG. REC. H31,981–82 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980)). 
 73. Id. 
 74. CERCLA’s main liability provision, Section 107, provides that any cov-
ered persons or entities (see infra Part I.B for a discussion on the scope of cov-
ered persons) “shall be liable for,” inter alia, all cleanup costs incurred by the 
government not inconsistent with the National Oil and Hazardous Substances 
Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2012). The NCP is 
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liability under the Superfund statute was meant to be “deter-
mined under common law principles,”75 including giving defend-
ants the burden of proving divisibility as a defense to joint and 
several liability. 
B. CERCLA’S LIABILITY SCHEME AND THE DOCTRINE OF 
DIVISIBILITY 
Despite the Congressional debate surrounding the liability 
provisions of CERCLA, it is clear from the legislative history and 
subsequent case law that Superfund liability under Section 107 
was intended to be joint and several through the application of 
“traditional and evolving principles of common law.”76 Indeed, 
“most courts recognize that CERCLA does not mandate the im-
position of joint and several liability,” but will apply such a 
standard “when a person or entity causes a single and indivisible 
harm.”77 
CERCLA Section 107 provides insight into when exactly a 
person can be held liable for such a harm. There are four general 
classes of parties, referred to in CERCLA as Potentially Respon-
sible Parties (PRPs), who are subject to potential joint and sev-
eral liability under Section 107: (1) current owners and operators 
of a facility; (2) past owners and operators of a facility; (3) enti-
ties that generated or arranged for hazardous substance 
transport and/or disposal; and (4) entities that transported the 
hazardous material.78 If an entity fits into one of the four PRP 
categories, strict liability is triggered if: (1) there are hazardous 
wastes present at the facility; (2) there is a release (or a threat-
ened release) of the hazardous substances; and (3) response costs 
have been or will be incurred.79 
 
the federal government’s blueprint for implementing CERCLA and “outlines a 
step-by-step process for conducting both removal and remedial actions.” See SU-
PERFUND ORIENTATION MANUAL, supra note 8, at II-6. 
 75. Maloney, supra note 26, at 546 (internal citation omitted). 
 76. Id. at 541 (citing 126 CONG. REC. H31,965 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (state-
ment of Rep. Florio (D-N.J.)) (emphasis added)). 
 77. Lawrence S. Coven, Liability Under CERCLA: After a Decade of Dele-
gation, the Time Is Ripe for Legislative Reform, 17 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 165, 192 
(1990) (citing United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 172 (4th Cir. 1988) 
(applying RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (AM. LAW INST. 1976)), cert. 
denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989)). 
 78. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)–(4); see also Enforcement: Superfund Liability, 
EPA, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/superfund-liability (last visited Oct. 31, 
2018). 
 79. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)–(4); see also Enforcement: Superfund Liability, 
supra note 78. 
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The text of statute states that following the releaseor 
threatened releaseof a hazardous substance, PRPs may only 
escape liability by proving that the release was caused by an act 
of God, war, or a third party.80 However, through the application 
of common law tort liability principles, courts have determined 
that PRPs may also escape joint and several liability by proving 
that the harm is divisible—a rare showing that usually has a 
high evidentiary bar.81 To determine whether harm is divisible, 
or capable of being apportioned among multiple causes, courts in 
CERCLA cases turn to Section 433A of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, and ask whether “there is a reasonable basis for deter-
mining the contribution of each cause to a single harm.”82 The 
doctrine of divisibility is an important piece of the Superfund 
puzzle because it gives PRPs the opportunity to escape the pow-
erful jaws of joint and several liability, and to only be held liable 
for a portion of the total cleanup cost proportional to that party’s 
culpability.83 
 
 80. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). CERCLA has three narrowly defined affirmative 
defenses, and in lieu of proving one of them, PRPs may only escape joint and 
several liability under Section 107 by showing that the harm in question is di-
visible. See, e.g., Gold, supra note 14, at 308. Currently, the third party defense 
excludes innocent landowners, bona fide prospective purchasers and contiguous 
property owners from Superfund liability if the party in question can meet a 
number of statutory requirements. See, e.g., Sudhir Lay Burgaard, Landowner 
Defenses to CERCLA Liability, A.B.A. YOUNG LAW. DIVISION: 101 PRAC. SERIES 
PUBLICATIONS, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/ 
publications/the_101_201_practice_series/landowner_defenses_to_cercla_ 
liability.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2018). CERCLA’s statutory defenses are nar-
rowly construed by the courts and “PRPs have had difficulty meeting their bur-
den.” Frank Leone & Mark A. Miller, Acts of God, War, and Third Parties: The 
Previously Overlooked CERCLA Defenses, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,129, 10,135 
(2015). 
 81. See, e.g., Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chi. v. N. Am. Gal-
vanizing & Coatings, Inc., 473 F.3d 824, 827 n.3 (7th Cir. 2007) (“The only ex-
ception to joint liability is when the harm is divisible, but this is a rare sce-
nario.”); United States v. NCR Corp., No. 10–C–910, 2017 WL 3668771, at *5 
(E.D. Wis. Aug. 23, 2017) (appeal filed) (“Prior to Burlington Northern, excep-
tions to joint and several CERCLA liability were considered rare and the EPA 
could usually recover its costs in full from any responsible party, regardless of 
that party’s relative fault.”). 
 82. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 614 
(2009) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 
1965)). Courts use the Restatement (Second)’s approach in analyzing divisibility 
of harm because it reflects tort common law at the time that the Restatement 
was written. See infra notes 88–99 and accompanying text. 
 83. Parties found liable under Section 107 may also sue other liable parties 
or PRPs for contribution pursuant to CERCLA Section 113(f ) . This process al-
lows courts to “allocate response costs among liable parties using . . . equitable 
factors . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f ) . However, where there are no viable PRPs to 
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The first seminal case that analyzed the liability standard 
under Section 107 of CERCLA was United States v. Chem-Dyne 
Corp.84 In Chem-Dyne, the United States sued twenty-four al-
leged generators and transporters of the hazardous substances 
discovered at the Chem-Dyne Superfund Site under Section 107 
of CERCLA for recovery of costs expended in carrying out reme-
dial activities.85 The defendants moved for partial summary 
judgment, asking the court to determine that they were not 
jointly and severally liable for remediation costs at the Chem-
Dyne facility in an effort to mitigate their financial exposure.86 
In denying the defendants’ motion, the court turned to Super-
fund’s legislative history to glean the Congressional intent be-
hind the statute.87 Importantly, the court noted that the deletion 
of the term “joint and several liability” from Superfund was to 
avoid a blanket rule applicable in all cases that might lead to 
inequitable results, rather than an outright rejection of joint and 
several liability in all cases.88 The court went on to explain that 
liability under the statute was to be determined under “common 
law principles” and that the application of joint and several lia-
bility would be determined on a case-by-case basis evaluating 
the complicated scenarios at multiple-generator Superfund 
sites.89 
Because CERCLA’s subject matter was “easily distin-
guish[able] from areas of primarily state concern,” the statute 
was passed “in the exercise of a constitutional function or 
power,” and federal programs “must be uniform in character,” 
the court determined that the standard of liability should be de-
termined under a uniform federal common law rule.90 Relying on 
legislative history, the court refused to apply a generally appli-
cable rule of joint and several liability similar to the standard 
 
sue in contribution, a liable party’s only option to blunt the harshness of joint 
and several liability is to prove divisibility of harm (absent an applicable statu-
tory affirmative defense). See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 84. See Gold, supra note 14, at 311–12, 312 n.25 (referring to United States 
v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983) as the seminal CERCLA 
opinion dealing with the issue of liability and apportionment of harm under 
CERCLA Section 107). 
 85. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 804. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 805–08 (analyzing the impetus of Superfund’s enactment and the 
lengthy floor debates that occurred in both the House and Senate in considering 
the amended version of S. 1480 for passage). 
 88. Id. at 808 (internal citations to legislative history omitted). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 808–09. 
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under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,91 more com-
monly known as the Clean Water Act.92 Instead, the court ap-
plied the common law approach of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts: “when two or more persons acting independently cause[] 
a distinct or single harm for which there is a reasonable basis for 
division according to the contribution of each, each is subject to 
liability only for the portion of the total harm that he has himself 
caused.”93 However, where a single and indivisible harm is 
caused by two or more persons, each person is potentially liable 
for the entire harm.94 The court also determined that where two 
or more persons’ actions combine to violate CERCLA, and a de-
fendant seeks to limit their liability on the basis that the harm 
is divisible, that defendant bears the burden of proving that the 
harm is capable of apportionment.95 Construing the facts in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court then found that 
the defendants had not met their burden in showing a reasona-
ble basis for apportionment of harm, and accordingly denied the 
motion for partial summary judgment.96 
All CERCLA cases post-Chem-Dyne have affirmed the 
court’s analytical framework and courts continue to apply the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts in determining whether harm is 
divisible, or whether joint and several liability is appropriate for 
cost recovery actions under Superfund Section 107.97 Congress 
eventually affirmed the Chem-Dyne court’s approach in its con-
sideration of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization 
 
 91. Id. at 808 (“[T]he term [joint and several liability] was omitted in order 
to have the scope of liability determined under common law principles, where a 
court performing a case by case evaluation of the complex factual scenarios as-
sociated with multiple-generator waste sites will assess the propriety of apply-
ing joint and several liability on an individual basis.”). 
 92. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012). 
 93. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 810 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS §§ 433A, 881 (AM. LAW INST. 1976)). 
 94. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (AM. LAW INST. 
1976)). 
 95. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B (AM. LAW INST. 
1976)). 
 96. Id. at 811. 
 97. See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 
599, 614 (2009) (“Following Chem-Dyne, the Courts of Appeals have acknowl-
edged that ‘the universal starting point for divisibility of harm analyses in CER-
CLA cases’ is § 433A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.” (citing Chem-Nu-
clear Sys., Inc. v. Bush, 292 F.3d 254, 259 (D.C. Cir. 2002)); United States v. 
Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706, 717 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. R.W. Meyer, 
Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1507 (6th Cir. 1989)). 
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Act’s (SARA’s)98 contribution provision.99 This presumptive joint 
and several liability that can only be tempered by proving divis-
ibility may seem like a harsh practice because it is; Congress did 
not design CERCLA to be fair. Rather, Congress designed CER-
CLA with two overarching goals—promoting timely cleanup of 
sites contaminated with hazardous waste, and ensuring that 
those responsible for the contamination pay for the cleanup 
(“polluter pays”).100 
Successful divisibility defenses were rare in the years after 
Chem-Dyne.101 After Burlington Northern, described in the next 
Section, many practitioners and commentators thought that the 
Railroads’ success in proving divisibility of harm would ease the 
burden of proof for future CERCLA defendants and make it eas-
ier for PRPs to successfully assert divisibility arguments.102 
 
 98. The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) was 
passed in 1986 and “codified judicial interpretation of CERCLA since 1980.” 
Maloney, supra note 26, at 546 n.167 (citing SARA, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 
613 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.)). 
 99. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171 n.23 (4th Cir. 1988) 
(observing that the Chem-Dyne court’s approach towards analyzing joint and 
several liability under CERCLA “was subsequently confirmed as correct by Con-
gress in its consideration of SARA’s contribution provisions”). 
 100. Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 602 (“[CERCLA] was designed to promote 
the ‘timely cleanup of hazardous waste sites’ and to ensure that the costs of such 
cleanup efforts were borne by those responsible for the contamination.”) (quot-
ing Consol. Edison Co. v. UGI Util., Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 94 (2d Cir. 2005)). 
 101. See, e.g., Martha L. Judy, Coming Full CERCLA: Why Burlington 
Northern Is Not the Sword of Damocles for Joint and Several Liability, 44 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 249, 283, 283 n.17 (2010) (stating that prior to 2009, of the 160 
federal cases citing to Chem-Dyne, defendants met their burden of proving di-
visibility only four times). 
 102. See Cost Recovery: Burlington Northern Decision Called New Path to 
Fairness Under CERCLA, TOXICS L. REP. (BNA) (May 21, 2009) (discussing 
comments made by Burlington Northern’s counsel that the Supreme Court’s af-
firmation of the district court’s finding of divisibility on a “highly limited factual 
record” in Burlington Northern “reverse[d] a long-standing presumption by 
[EPA] in favor of joint and several liability in multiple-party cases”); see also 
Gold, supra note 14, at 311 n.22 (referring to an article that argued “apportion-
ment will be more available, more defendants will argue for apportionment, and 
defendants will have increased leverage in settlement negotiations with govern-
ment” as a result of Burlington Northern). But see Gold, supra note 14, at 311 
(“[T]he Burlington Northern decision should have relatively limited impact on 
CERCLA litigation, if federal courts understand and apply the Supreme Court’s 
opinion properly.”); Cruden ELI Speech, supra note 1, at 1 (arguing that because 
Burlington Northern “arose from an unusual fact pattern,” it is not “the death 
knell of Superfund enforcement” and actually “reaffirms the law of joint and 
several liability”). 
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C. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF BURLINGTON NORTHERN103 AND 
THE DIVISIBILITY FRAMEWORK 
Pre-Burlington Northern, courts tended to allow apportion-
ment only in relatively simple CERCLA cases, where divisibility 
hinged on a single factor, such as at a site with geographically 
separated pollutants or multiple PRPs operating a facility for 
mutually exclusive periods of time.104 However, in affirming the 
district court’s finding that the contamination at the Arvin Su-
perfund Site was theoretically divisible and capable of apportion-
ment, the Supreme Court relied on a combination of geographic, 
temporal, and volumetric/toxicity factors.105 
As discussed in the Introduction, B & B, the owner and op-
erator of the Arvin facility and the party responsible for the con-
tamination at the site, became insolvent in 1989 and was unable 
to continue cleanup activities.106 That same year, EPA added the 
Arvin Site to the National Priorities List (NPL)107 and, in coop-
eration with the California Department of Toxic Substances 
Control (CDTSC), exercised its authority pursuant to CERCLA 
Section 104 to begin cleanup activities at the site108 using monies 
from the Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund (Superfund 
 
 103. For simplicity’s sake, this Note does not address the Supreme Court’s 
analysis of Shell Oil Co.’s liability as an “arranger.” For a detailed discussion of 
the Burlington Northern “arranger” issue, see, for example, Steven Ferrey, Re-
configuration of Superfund Liability: The Disconnection Between Supreme 
Court Decisions and the Lower Federal Courts, 41 SW. L. REV. 598, 608–10, 612 
(2012) and Judy, supra note 101, at 253.  
 104. See Bina Joshi, Apportionment of CERCLA Liability Post-Burlington 
Northern, 25 ENVTL. LITIG. 2, 2 (2014), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
litigation/committees/environmental-energy/articles/2014/spring2014 
-apportionment-of-cercla-liability-post-burlington.html. 
 105. Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 606, 615–17; see also Joshi, supra note 104, 
at 3. Some scholars argue that the district court’s reliance on multiple factors 
in determining apportionment was flawed. See, e.g., William C. Tucker, All Is 
Number: Mathematics, Divisibility and Apportionment Under Burlington 
Northern, 22 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 312–13 (2011) (arguing that appor-
tionment of a single harm has only been appropriate in simple cases, “when one 
theory of divisibility was alleged,” and that the Supreme Court in Burlington 
Northern affirmed a “flawed method of calculating the Railroads’ apportioned 
share of liability,” resulting in an “artificially-created unapportioned share”). 
 106. Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 605. 
 107. The National Priorities List, or NPL, “is the list of sites of national pri-
ority among the known releases or threatened releases of hazardous sub-
stances . . . throughout the United States,” and guides EPA in determining 
which sites warrant further investigation. Superfund: National Priorities List 
(NPL), EPA, https://www.epa.gov/superfund/superfund-national-priorities-list 
-npl (last visited Oct. 31, 2018). 
 108. Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 605. 
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Trust Fund).109 To recoup their expended cleanup costs, EPA and 
CDTSC brought a cost recovery action110 against the Railroads 
as joint owners of the leased nine-acre portion of the Arvin facil-
ity.111 Four years after a six-week bench trial,112 the district 
court ruled in favor of the Government, holding that the Rail-
roads were PRPs under CERCLA Section 107 as “owners of a 
portion of the facility.”113 
Although the Railroads did not explicitly raise the issue of 
divisibility at trial, the district court sua sponte searched the ev-
identiary record to answer the question of divisibility.114 The dis-
trict court first determined that the harm at the Arvin Super-
fund Site was a “single harm” consisting of “contaminated soil at 
various locations and depths around the Site and one . . . plume 
of contaminated groundwater.”115 Then, the district court found 
that the length of time that B & B leased the parcel from the 
Railroads was thirteen years, or 45% of the total amount of time 
B & B was the sloppy operator116 of the facility,117 and that the 
 
 109. In addition to outlining the liability framework for PRPs, CERCLA au-
thorized the creation of the Superfund Trust Fund, a fund financed by a tax on 
the petroleum and chemical industries, general revenues, earned interest and 
cost recoveries from PRPs. 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(11) (2012); 
SUPERFUND ORIENTATION MANUAL, supra note 8, at II-1 to II-2. EPA uses mon-
ies from the Superfund Trust Fund to pay for site cleanup when PRPs cannot 
be identified or if PRPs are unsuccessful at their own remediation and/or re-
moval efforts. SUPERFUND ORIENTATION MANUAL, supra note 8, at II-2. 
 110. EPA has the authority, pursuant to CERCLA Section 107, to recover all 
response action costs and damages to natural resources. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607(a)(4)(A)–(D); SUPERFUND ORIENTATION MANUAL, supra note 8, at IV-3. 
Typically, EPA will pursue cost recovery actions if negotiation and settlement 
with PRPs is unsuccessful and the government chooses to perform the cleanup 
work itself, or when PRPs are identified after the government has incurred re-
sponse costs and seeks to recoup them. SUPERFUND ORIENTATION MANUAL, su-
pra note 8, at IV-11. 
 111. Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 605. 
 112. Id. (“The District Court conducted a 6-week bench trial in 1999 and four 
years later entered a judgment in favor of the Governments.”).  
 113. Id.; see also United States v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., Nos. 
CV-F-92-5068 OWW, CV-F-96-6226 OWW, CV-F-96-6228 OWW, 2003 WL 
25518047, at *52 (E.D. Cal. July 15, 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 520 F.3d 
918 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 556 U.S. 599 (2009). 
 114. Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 622–23 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing 
the district court’s “heroic labor” in apportioning costs, despite the fact that the 
Railroads did not make any arguments regarding apportionment of liability); 
see also Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 2003 WL 25518047, at *87–91.  
 115. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 2003 WL 25518047, at *87. 
 116. Id. at *95 (“By everyone’s account, B & B was a sloppy operator.”). 
 117. Id. at *88 (“The total length of the B & B-Railroad lease, 13 years, is 
45% of the B & B total of 29 years of operations at the Site from 1960 to 1989.”). 
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Railroads’ parcel constituted 19.1% of the surface area of the en-
tire Arvin site.118 The district court also noted that the “over-
whelming majority of hazardous substances were released from 
the B & B parcel,” and not from the parcel leased by the Rail-
roads.119 Taking the geographic and temporal factors into ac-
count, assuming that two-thirds of the site contamination re-
sulted from chemical spills on the Railroads’ leased parcel, and 
using a 50% “fudge factor,”120 the district court held that the 
Railroads’ contribution to the harm at the Arvin Superfund Site 
could be no more than 9%, and therefore, that they were respon-
sible for only 9% of EPA’s total response costs at the facility.121 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed 
that the harm caused by the Railroads was theoretically capable 
of apportionment but reversed the district court and held that 
the defendants had not met their burden in showing a reasona-
ble basis for apportionment.122 Because the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that the Railroads had not met their burden in proving 
divisibility, the ruling held the Railroads jointly and severally 
liable for cleanup costs at the Arvin Superfund Site.123 
The Supreme Court then reversed the Ninth Circuit, hold-
ing that the “District Court reasonably apportioned the Rail-
roads’ share of the site remediation costs at 9%.”124 Specifically, 
 
 118. Id. (“The evidence shows that the Railroad parcel is approximately 
19.1% of the surface area of the total site.”). 
 119. Id. 
 120. The Supreme Court held that “any miscalculation . . . [was] harmless 
in light of the District Court’s ultimate allocation of liability, which included a 
50% margin of error.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 
U.S. 599, 618 (2009). 
 121. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 2003 WL 25518047, at *90–91 
(multiplying together 19%, the proportion of the Arvin site’s surface area occu-
pied by the Railroads’ leased parcel; 45%, the proportion B & B’s time spent as 
the owner/operator of the facility during which it leased the Railroads’ parcel; 
and 66%, the proportion of the site contamination attributable to spills on the 
leased parcel, and allowing for calculation errors of up to 50%, the district court 
arrived at an apportioned liability share of 9% for the Railroads). 
 122. The Ninth Circuit found that the record lacked sufficient data to deter-
mine the “precise proportion of contamination that occurred on the relative por-
tions of the Arvin facility and the rate of contamination in the years prior to 
B & B’s addition of the Railroad parcel.” Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 617. Fur-
ther, the Ninth Circuit held that the lease duration and size of the leased area 
were not reliable measures of the contamination on the portion of the site owned 
by the Railroads. Id.  
 123. United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 952 
(9th Cir. 2008).  
 124. Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 619. 
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the Supreme Court concluded that the facts in the record “rea-
sonably supported the apportionment of liability,” according to 
the principles outlined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.125 
The Court held that the district court’s use of the leased parcel’s 
size and the lease’s duration as a starting point for its divisibility 
analysis was reasonable, and that any miscalculations resulting 
from the assumption that two-thirds of the contamination 
stemmed from the leased parcel were rendered harmless by the 
inclusion of a 50% margin of error.126 By limiting the Railroads’ 
share of the cleanup costs to 9% and not including the portion of 
the harm attributed to the then-insolvent B & B, the Court re-
quired the government, and by extension the taxpayers, to pay 
for an “orphan share”127 of approximately 91% of the total site 
remediation costs.128  
In the aftermath of Burlington Northern, many practition-
ers and commentators thought that the Supreme Court’s signif-
icant deference to the district court’s finding of divisibility using 
multiple theories of apportionment on a highly complicated fac-
tual record would result in a lower burden of proof for PRPs ar-
guing for an apportionment of liability.129 However, as the next 
Part shows, that has not been the case. Subsequent decisions 
 
 125. See Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 617–19. Even though the burden of prov-
ing divisibility normally falls to the party raising the defense, the district court 
took it upon itself to perform the apportionment analysis because the railroads 
and the government both “effectively abdicated providing any helpful argu-
ments to the court” by taking an all-or-nothing approach to liability and advo-
cating for 0% and 100% liability, respectively. United States v. Atchison, Topeka 
& Santa Fe Ry., No. CV-F-92-5068 OWW, No. CV-F-96-6226 OWW, No. CV-F-
96-6228 OWW, 2003 WL 25518047, at *82 (E.D. Cal. July 15, 2003). The Su-
preme Court did not address the burden of proof issue, instead framing the 
question as “whether the record provided a reasonable basis for the District 
Court’s conclusion that the Railroads were liable for only 9% of the harm caused 
by contamination at the Arvin facility.” Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 615. 
 126. Id. at 617–19. 
 127. An orphan share is the share of liability at a given Superfund site that 
can be attributed to an insolvent or defunct party or nonparty. See Kenneth K. 
Kilbert, Neither Joint nor Several: Orphan Shares and Private CERCLA Ac-
tions, 41 ENVTL. L. 1045, 1067 (2011).  
 128. See Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 618–19; see also Bradley Marten, U.S. 
Supreme Court Holds that Superfund Liability Is Not Joint and Several Where 
a Reasonable Basis for Apportionment Exists; Court also Narrows Arranger Li-
ability, MARTEN L. (May 4, 2009), https://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/ 
20090504-superfund-liability. 
 129. See supra note 102 and accompanying text; see also Ashley II of Charles-
ton, LLC v. PCS Nitrogen, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 2d 431, 483 (D.S.C. 2011) (“Some 
legal commentary and case law have interpreted Burlington Northern to lessen 
the burden on defendants seeking to avoid joint and several liability by demon-
strating a reasonable basis for apportionment.”). 
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have determined that Burlington Northern simply reiterated the 
Chem-Dyne approach to apportionment and did not endorse a 
shift in the divisibility analytical framework.130 
II.  SITE COMPLEXITY AND AN OUTDATED ANALYTICAL 
FRAMEWORK CONTRIBUTE TO CERCLA DEFENDANTS’ 
LACK OF SUCCESS IN ASSERTING DIVISIBILITY 
DEFENSES   
In the thirty-three post-Burlington Northern apportionment 
cases,131 courts continue to limit divisibility in all but the sim-
plest circumstances. Section A delves into a representative se-
lection of post-Burlington Northern apportionment cases and ar-
gues that PRPs’ lack of success in proving divisibility defenses is 
due in part to the reliance on the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
as the analytical framework. Section B discusses the trends in 
United States tort law and argues that the judiciary’s current 
approach to analyzing apportionment of harm in CERCLA cases 
is outdated. Section C discusses the major differences between 
the Restatement (Second) and the Restatement (Third), and con-
tends that the latter better reflects the current state of tort com-
mon law. 
A. POST-BURLINGTON NORTHERN, APPORTIONMENT OF HARM 
CONTINUES TO BE A HIGH BAR FOR CERCLA DEFENDANTS TO 
REACH 
Superfund jurisprudence after Burlington Northern has 
continued the trend of widespread joint and several liability for 
PRPs sued for cost recovery under CERCLA Section 107,132 and 
courts continue to exclusively use the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts in analyzing apportionment of harm.133 Since Burlington 
Northern, there have been thirty-three CERCLA cases analyzing 
the issue of apportionment; only two concluded that the harm in 
 
 130. See, e.g., United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., No. 91–0768–
JAM–JFM, 2010 WL 1854118, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 6, 2010); Joshi, supra note 
104. See also infra Part II.A, for a discussion of post-Burlington Northern cases 
dealing with divisibility defenses. 
 131. See infra Appendix, for a table of CERCLA cases that analyze the issue 
of divisibility of harm. 
 132. See Derek Wetmore, Joint and Several Liability After Burlington 
Northern: Alive and Well, 32 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 27, 40–44, 59 (2014). 
 133. See, e.g., United States v. NCR Corp., 688 F.3d 833, 838 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(“The ‘universal starting point for divisibility of harm analysis in CERCLA 
cases’ is § 433A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.” (quoting Burlington N., 
556 U.S. at 614)).  
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question was divisible.134 The PRPs’ success in asserting a divis-
ibility defense in both cases was likely due, at least in part, to 
the simple factual circumstances surrounding the contamina-
tion, compared to that at a typical Superfund site, allowing the 
courts to find a reasonable basis for apportionment of harm. 
1. Successful Divisibility Defenses: Reichhold and City of Gary 
The first post-Burlington Northern case resulting in a suc-
cessful divisibility defense is Reichhold, Inc. v. U.S. Metals Re-
fining Co.,135 a 2009 case issued shortly after Burlington North-
ern. Despite the Reichhold trial taking place before Burlington 
Northern was decided, the Supreme Court’s decision apparently 
influenced the New Jersey federal court’s divisibility analysis.136 
Reichhold, Inc. conducted a series of real estate transactions, 
triggering an affirmative duty under a state environmental stat-
ute for the company “to investigate possible environmental con-
tamination at the Site and to remediate such contamination.”137 
After expending cleanup costs, Reichhold sued United States 
Metals Refining Company (USMRC) for cost recovery under 
CERCLA Section 107 as the past owner of the contaminated 
site.138 Reichhold sought to be reimbursed for, inter alia, the cost 
of capping139 a particular parcel of soil at the site as required by 
the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection 
(NJDEP).140 
The Reichhold court found that the contamination that ne-
cessitated the cap had two separate causes—USMRC’s historic 
smelting operations and extensive use of large amounts of me-
tallic slag as fill material throughout the parcel, and a third 
party’s depositing of an additional two to three feet of fill mate-
rial containing hazardous metals—and that either cause alone 
would have spurred NJDEP to require installation of the cap.141 
 
 134. City of Gary v. Shafer, No. 2:07–CV–56–PRC, 2011 WL 3439239, at *3 
(N.D. Ind. Aug. 5, 2011); Reichhold, Inc. v. U.S. Metals Ref. Co., 655 F. Supp. 2d 
400, 448–49 (D.N.J. 2009). 
 135. Reichhold, 655 F. Supp. 2d 400. 
 136. See id. at 448 (“The recent Supreme Court decision in [Burlington 
Northern] suggests that this situation might be addressed by apportionment 
rather than equitable principles.”); Wetmore, supra note 132, at 41. 
 137. Reichhold, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 406. 
 138. Id. at 404. 
 139. See supra note 17 for more information on capping as a remedy for soil 
contamination. 
 140. Reichhold, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 448. 
 141. Id. 
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Looking to the then-recent Burlington Northern opinion for guid-
ance, the Reichhold court determined that the hazardous metals 
contamination that was remedied by the cap was a “distinct or 
single harm that USMRC and a third party caused,” and that 
the reasonable basis for apportionment was the fact that “each 
[party] was responsible for a sufficient amount of metals contam-
ination that required the cap.”142 Thus, rather than apportioning 
the harm according to the amount of hazardous metal contami-
nation that each party was directly responsible for, the Reich-
hold court split the difference and held USMRC liable for fifty 
percent of the costs associated with the cap.143 
The second post-Burlington Northern case where a PRP suc-
cessfully asserted a divisibility defense is City of Gary v. 
Shafer.144 Despite the court’s citing of Burlington Northern, City 
of Gary is not an example of an easing of the divisibility stand-
ard,145 partly because the court’s order seems to conflate Section 
107 apportionment with Section 113 allocation through its reli-
ance on equitable factors in “apportioning” the harm.146 Despite 
the case being a CERCLA Section 107 cost recovery claim,147 the 
court cited both CERCLA Section 107, which allows for appor-
tionment of liability when there is a reasonable basis for dividing 
causation, and CERCLA Section 113, which allows for allocation 
of liability considering causation and equitable factors.148 Nev-
ertheless, because of the small number of cases involving suc-
cessful divisibility defenses, it is illuminating to discuss the facts 
and analysis underlying the apportionment issue in City of Gary. 
The defendant in City of Gary, Paul’s Auto Yard, Inc., was 
the operator of the site in question for approximately two years 
 
 142. Id. at 448–49 (adopting the Burlington Northern court’s use of the Re-
statement (Second) in analyzing divisibility of harm at the site). 
 143. Id. at 449. Both parties in Reichold were financially solvent and able to 
pay their half of the bill. See id. 
 144. City of Gary v. Shafer, No. 2:07–CV–56–PRC, 2011 WL 3439239, at *3 
(N.D. Ind. Aug. 5, 2011). 
 145. Wetmore, supra note 132, at 42. 
 146. City of Gary, 2011 WL 3439239, at *1–3. “While section 107 determines 
the amount of contribution based solely on actual contamination caused by 
PRPs, section 113 allows courts to examine equitable concerns when allocating 
liability.” Foy, supra note 24, at 640 n.113. Further, while any party that has 
incurred cleanup costs (PRP or otherwise) may bring a Section 107 cost recovery 
action, a contribution suit under Section 113 is only available to “PRPs already 
subjected to an EPA-initiated cost recovery action or cleanup order.” Id. (citing 
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004)).  
 147. See City of Gary v. Shafer, 683 F. Supp. 2d 836, 840 (N.D. Ind. 2010).  
 148. City of Gary, 2011 WL 3439239, at *2–3 (emphasis added).  
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and moved a small amount of previously contaminated soil, re-
sulting in a release of hazardous substances and liability under 
CERCLA.149 At the damages phase of the trial, the court consid-
ered “the allocation of . . . [the defendant’s] proportionate share 
of the total liability.”150 Relying on expert testimony, the court 
determined that the defendant contributed to the lead contami-
nation at the site through moving already-contaminated soil, but 
that any contribution was de minimus.151 The court considered 
temporal and volumetric factors, and held that “[the defendant’s] 
proportionate share in the lead contamination of the soil . . . con-
stituted no more than 0.24% of the whole of the contamina-
tion.”152 The court concluded that Paul’s Auto Yard, Inc.’s slight 
moving of “no more than 0.24% of the total volume of lead-con-
taminated soil” within “a relatively short period of time” was “a 
reasonable, objective, measurable, concrete, [and] specific basis 
for allocation of liability” and ordered that Paul’s Auto Yard, 
Inc.’s financial contribution be “0.24% of the total costs.”153 
These two successful instances of a divisibility defense are 
likely due, at least in part, to the simple factual circumstances 
of each case. Despite the inclusion of equitable factors in City of 
Gary, the court considered temporal and volumetric variables in 
allocating liability154 and the Reichhold court apportioned liabil-
ity of the single harm according to two distinct yet sufficient 
causes.155 
2. A More Typical Example: NCR Corpation’s Failed 
Divisibility Defense in the Fox River Superfund Litigation 
The methodologies used in these two cases might not be fea-
sible in a situation with a more complex history of hazardous 
waste contamination. For example, take United States v. NCR 
Corp.,156 a more typical post-Burlington Northern Superfund 
 
 149. See id. at *2–4. 
 150. Id. at *1. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at *2. Active soil contamination occurred for a period of approxi-
mately thirty-eight years and the defendant’s de minimus moving of contami-
nated soil occurred during a window of approximately 1.5 years, or about 3.95% 
of the time period of interest. Id. The volume of lead-contaminated soil disturbed 
by the defendant “was no more than 0.1% to 0.24% of the total volume of con-
tamination.” Id. 
 153. Id. at *3.  
 154. See id. at *1–2. 
 155. Reichhold, Inc. v. U.S. Metals Ref. Co., 655 F. Supp. 2d 400, 448–49 
(D.N.J. 2009). 
 156. United States v. NCR Corp., No. 10–C–910, 2017 WL 3668771 (E.D. 
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case involving apportionment of harm at the Fox River Super-
fund site in Wisconsin, “one of the last and largest uncontrolled 
sources of [toxic polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs)] into Lake 
Michigan.”157 The PCB contamination at the Fox River Super-
fund Site resulted primarily from the use of a PCB-containing 
solvent in the production of carbonless copy paper from 1954 to 
1971.158 Contamination at the site was pervasive, with several 
paper mills discharging approximately 700,000 pounds of toxic 
PCBs into the Fox River via “numerous wastewater discharge 
points” over a period of seventeen years.159 Before cleanup at the 
site began, there were approximately fourteen million yards of 
contaminated sediments containing 65,000 pounds of PCBs, and 
every year, an estimated 620 pounds of PCBs were flushed from 
the river into Green Bay.160 
Initially, a variety of paper mills, municipalities, and other 
entities undertook voluntary and involuntary remedial actions 
to clean up the PCB-laden sediments.161 However, NCR Corp. 
(NCR), the sole manufacturer of the toxic coating on every sheet 
of carbonless copy paper, eventually ceased its voluntary cleanup 
activities after an unfavorable ruling against it left it without 
the option to sue other PRPs in a Section 113 contribution ac-
tion.162 EPA then filed a CERCLA action against NCR and 
eleven other PRPs to compel cleanup activities.163 Because CER-
CLA’s statutory defenses were not available to NCR,164 its sole 
defense to resisting EPA’s enforcement action was to show that 
the “harm was divisible and thus capable of apportionment.”165 
 
Wis. Aug. 23, 2017) (appeal filed). 
 157. Case Summary: NCR Corporation Agrees to End Litigation and Com-
plete PCBs Cleanup at Fox River Superfund Site, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/ 
enforcement/case-summary-ncr-corporation-agrees-end-litigation-and 
-complete-pcbs-cleanup-fox-river (last visited Oct. 31, 2018) [hereinafter Case 
Summary: NCR Corp.]. 
 158. NCR Corp., 2017 WL 3668771, at *1. 
 159. Case Summary: NCR Corp., supra note 157. 
 160. Id. 
 161. NCR Corp., 2017 WL 3668771, at *2–3. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at *4. 
 164. CERCLA’s three statutorily-defined defenses are the act of God, war, 
and third-party defenses; these defenses have been narrowly construed by the 
courts and are often difficult for PRPs to prove. See supra note 80 and accompa-
nying text. 
 165. NCR Corp., 2017 WL 3668771, at *4. 
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Inspired by the Railroads’ success in asserting a successful 
divisibility defense in Burlington Northern, NCR “focused its ef-
forts in the enforcement action” on establishing a similar defense 
“in an effort to substantially limit its ultimate liability.”166 Spe-
cifically, NCR undertook a very detailed and expensive study to 
carefully map portions of the Fox River.167 Through sediment 
analysis and historical document review, “one expert arrived at 
an estimate of the percentage of the total PCBs each PRP dis-
charged into [the Fox River] over . . . fifty-five years.”168 Another 
expert entered that data into a computer model designed to 
mimic the “movements of sediment and PCB transport in the 
river.”169 A third expert then correlated the conclusions of the 
first two experts with the actual remediation costs, dividing the 
river into “73 apportionment polygons, and arrived at a calcula-
tion of each party’s share of the remediation cost in each poly-
gon.”170 
NCR and Glatfelter, another paper manufacturer PRP, pre-
sented the expert divisibility evidence over the course of a two-
week trial.171 Following full briefing on the apportionment issue, 
the district court concluded that “NCR and Glatfelter had failed 
to prove that the harm caused by the discharge of PCBs into the 
river was divisible,” and held both parties jointly and severally 
liable.172 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals va-
cated the district court’s holding that the harm was not divisible 
and remanded the case, concluding that the district court had 
failed to explain why the mass-percentage estimates of one of 
NCR’s experts were unreliable.173 
After remand and acting on multiple motions for reconsid-
eration, the district court concluded that NCR failed to meet its 
burden in demonstrating “both that the harm [was] theoretically 
capable of divisibility and that there [was] a reasonable basis for 
apportionment.”174 Specifically, the court noted that the exten-
 
 166. Id. at *5. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. (citing United States v. NCR Corp., 960 F. Supp. 2d 793 (E.D. Wis. 
2013)). 
 173. Id. (citing United States v. P.H. Glatfelter, 768 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 
2014)). 
 174. United States v. NCR Corp., No. 10-C-910, 2015 WL 6142993, at *5 
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sive briefing accompanying the motions for reconsideration illu-
minated the problem that the data relied upon by one of NCR’s 
experts was inconsistent with “facts already found by the 
court.”175 The court also pointed out that because EPA’s selected 
remedy required dredging of all soils with a PCB concentration 
greater than one part-per-million (ppm) and the cost of soil re-
mediation was linearly proportional to the concentration of haz-
ardous PCBs, any apportionment framework using a uniform re-
mediation cost for any contamination greater than one ppm 
could not serve as a reasonable basis for apportioning costs.176 In 
other words, an acceptable apportionment framework should 
have accounted for the higher costs associated with remediating 
soil with higher levels of contamination. After the district court 
concluded that NCR had not met its burden in proving divisibil-
ity, NCR filed what amounted to a motion for reconsideration, 
which was denied,177 and requested certification for an interloc-
utory appeal on the divisibility issue.178 The district court denied 
the certification request because any appellate review would in-
volve a mixed question of law and fact, rather than a “pure ques-
tion of law.”179 NCR did not pursue its divisibility defense any 
further and eventually entered into a settlement agreement with 
the government.180 
The Fox River litigation is an excellent example of how most 
Superfund divisibility cases have turned out post-Burlington 
Northern. Despite undertaking an expensive study of the con-
tamination at the Fox River Superfund site, NCR was unable to 
establish a reasonable basis for apportioning the harm at the 
site, due in part to the historical complexities of how the PCB 
contamination occurred. In the aftermath of Burlington North-
ern, some courts “have rejected apportionment theories that do 
not address the entirety of the harm or the entirety of factors 
contributing to the harm at a site.”181 This makes sense because 
 
(E.D. Wis. Oct. 19, 2015). 
 175. Id. at *1 (stating, inter alia, that NCR’s expert attributed over 9000 kg 
of discharged PCBs to one PRP, despite a more credible expert finding that no 
more than 1166 kg of PCBs could be attributed to that PRP). 
 176. Id. at *4–5. 
 177. United States v. NCR Corp., No. 10-C-910, 2015 WL 6912545, at *1 
(E.D. Wis. Nov. 9, 2015). 
 178. Id. 
 179. United States v. NCR Corp., No. 10-C-910, 2016 WL 304805, at *2 (E.D. 
Wis. Jan. 25, 2016). 
 180. United States v. NCR Corp., No. 10-C-910, 2017 WL 3668771, at *15 
(E.D. Wis. Aug. 23, 2017). 
 181. Joshi, supra note 104, at 5 (citing, for example, Pakootas v. Teck 
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the more complicated the history of contamination at a site is, 
the more difficult it is to establish a reasonable basis for appor-
tioning the entirety of the harm. 
In arguing for divisibility, many PRPs point to factors such 
as “the length of time a party is involved with the site, [the] area 
of operation, or [the] geographic extent of chemical storage.”182 
However, proving divisibility using only temporal and geo-
graphic factors is difficult at all but the simplest sites. These fac-
tors can only provide a reasonable basis for apportionment when 
other variables, such as toxicity and synergistic effects, are rela-
tively consistent.183 The complex contamination pathways found 
at most Superfund sites and the related high burden of proof for 
a successful showing of apportionment continue to be significant 
hurdles for PRPs asserting divisibility defenses in the vast ma-
jority of CERCLA actions.184 In addition to the factual complex-
ity of most Superfund sites, the judiciary’s reliance on the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts as the divisibility framework also 
contributes to the high burden of proof for a successful divisibil-
ity showing because the framework is closer to the classic rule of 
presumptive joint and several liability.185 
 
Cominco Metals, Ltd., 868 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1117 (E.D. Wash. 2012)). 
 182. Wetmore, supra note 132, at 52. In fact, these factors provided the Rail-
roads in Burlington Northern a reasonable basis for apportioning harm. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Including the Fox River litigation, thirty-three courts have considered 
divisibility defenses post-Burlington Northern, but for one reason or another, 
PRPs have generally been unsuccessful in demonstrating a reasonable basis for 
apportioning harm. See, e.g., United States v. Fed. Res. Corp., 691 F. App’x 441, 
443 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding that the PRP “did not provide the court with a rea-
sonable basis for apportioning the harm at the . . . [s]ite” because it did not es-
tablish that there was a relationship between the volume of waste, the release 
of hazardous substances, and the harm at the site); PCS Nitrogen, Inc. v. Ashley 
II of Charleston LLC, 714 F.3d 161, 182–85 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding that the 
harm at the site was not divisible because the PRP’s proposed basis for appor-
tionment did not, inter alia, “provide for a reasonable estimate of the volume of 
soil contaminated by secondary disposals” or appropriately compensate for 
“changes in the type and intensity of uses and construction on the site over 
time”); Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown Grp. Retail, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 
1117–18 (D. Colo. 2011) (finding that the PRP’s proposed basis for apportion-
ment, relying on geographic and temporal factors, did not adequately address 
the “complex assessment of the relative toxicity, migratory potential, and syn-
ergistic capacity of the hazardous waste”—a showing which is often required 
when the harm to be apportioned consists of commingled wastes).  
 185. Cf. Wetmore, supra note 132, at 43 (describing the divisibility frame-
work presented in the Restatement (Third) of Torts as a “more liberal appor-
tionment analysis” compared to the analytical framework of the Restatement 
(Second)). 
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B. CERCLA’S CURRENT ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
DIVISIBILITY LAGS BEHIND THE REST OF TORT LAW 
As discussed above, Burlington Northern endorsed the 
Chem-Dyne court’s approach to divisibility analyses. While the 
Court in Burlington Northern analyzed divisibility under the Re-
statement (Second), Chem-Dyne itself looked to the then-current 
state of tort common law to determine the applicable liability 
standard.186 The Chem-Dyne court concluded that in 1983, the 
Restatement (Second)—adopted in 1976—best reflected the 
state of federal common law regarding the proper analytical 
framework for divisibility defenses to joint and several liabil-
ity.187 Yet, despite CERCLA courts’ historical reliance on the Re-
statement (Second), “[t]he clear trend [in tort law] over the past 
several decades has been a move away from pure joint and sev-
eral liability.”188 Whereas the Restatement (Second) certainly 
does not mandate joint and several liability and allows for ap-
portionment of harm,189 in practice, joint and several liability is 
widespread throughout Superfund litigation in part because of 
the judiciary’s application of a test that is difficult for PRPs to 
meet at all but the simplest sites.190 When the Restatement 
(Third) was published in 2000, fifteen states still employed pure 
joint and several liability schemes, with the remainder having 
“adopted some hybrid form of joint and several and several lia-
bility.”191 
Today, the trend in tort law has shifted even further away 
from joint and several liability in favor of some form of compar-
ative responsibility.192 Indeed, as of 2017, “forty states have mod-
ified the rule of joint and several liability,”193 twenty-eight of 
 
 186. See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio 
1983). 
 187. See id. 
 188. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Am. Tort Reform Ass’n in Support of De-
fendant-Appellant at 4, United States v. NCR Corp., 688 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 
2012) (No. 12–2069) [hereinafter ATRA Amicus Brief ]  (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 17 cmt. a, reporter’s note (AM. 
LAW INST. 2000)). 
 189. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 433A, 881 (AM. LAW INST. 
1976).  
 190. See supra Parts II.A.1–II.A.2, for a discussion of how divisibility de-
fenses tend to only be successful at Superfund Sites with simple factual scenar-
ios. 
 191. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 17 cmt. a, reporter’s note. 
 192. See AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N., TORT REFORM RECORD 4–12 (2017), 
http://www.atra.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Record-07-06-17.pdf. 
 193. Id. at 4. 
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which have eliminated joint and several liability to some extent 
for environmental harms.194 The majority of modifications to 
state joint and several liability schemes have come about by leg-
islation, as opposed to court decisions.195 Some scholars have ar-
gued that legislative efforts to blunt the harshness of joint and 
several liability schemes should not be viewed as changing the 
common law rule of liability.196 However, a state’s common law 
is necessarily informed by that state’s legislation in the sense 
that courts interpret statutes and are constrained by the legisla-
ture’s efforts.197 Thus, legislative changes to states’ joint and sev-
eral liability schemes should still be considered when analyzing 
the general shift among the states towards comparative respon-
sibility schemes. 
Just as the Restatement (Second) articulated the rules sur-
rounding the applicable liability scheme in CERCLA actions 
(drawing from both the common law and statutes that existed at 
that time), the Restatement (Third) should also be viewed as an 
accurate reflection of the common law that existed at the time of 
its publication. While no courts have explicitly endorsed the Re-
statement (Third), at least one court has interpreted Burlington 
Northern as “disallowing consideration of the Restatement 
 
 194. See id. at 4–12. The following states have shifted away from joint and 
several liability schemes to some degree, including where there is some sort of 
environmental harm at issue: Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connect-
icut, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Ok-
lahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, 
West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See id. The following states have also 
shifted away from joint and several liability schemes to some degree, but retain 
the potential for joint and several liability where there is some sort of environ-
mental harm: Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Nevada, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington. See id. 
 195. See id. In contrast to the pure legislative efforts of other states, Ken-
tucky’s 1988 statute, HB 551, “codified the common law rule that when a jury 
apportions fault, a defendant is only liable for that share of the fault.” Id. at 6. 
 196. Justin R. Pidot & Dale Ratliff, The Common Law of Liable Party CER-
CLA Claims, 70 STAN. L. REV. 191, 238, 238 n.256 (2018). 
 197. See also Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in the Age 
of the Regulatory State, 92 IOWA L. REV. 545, 549 (2007); Alexandra B. Klass, 
From Reservoirs to Remediation: The Impact of CERCLA on Common Law 
Strict Liability Environmental Claims, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 903, 905 
(2004); cf. Richard L. Revesz, Restatements and Federal Statutes, AM. L. INST. 
(Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.ali.org/news/articles/restatements-and-federal 
-statutes (“Traditionally, our Restatements dealt with areas of state common 
law. Of course, they recognized the existence of state statutes but those statutes 
were generally treated as constraints that displaced discrete common law rules 
in particular jurisdictions.”).  
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(Third) . . . approach to apportionment.”198 However, it is clear 
that the Burlington Northern court’s reliance on the Chem-Dyne 
approach to apportionment, that is, an inquiry into the divisibil-
ity of a single harm based on “evolving notions of common law,” 
rather than the Restatement (Second) explicitly, indicates that 
there should be some future role for the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts in Superfund apportionment analyses.199 
C. THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS DIFFERS FROM THE 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) IN THAT IT REFLECTS THE STATES’ 
GENERAL SHIFT AWAY FROM JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY 
SCHEMES 
The Restatement (Third) of Torts elaborates on the Restate-
ment (Second)’s apportionment framework by “explaining that 
apportionment is proper where [the] ‘legally culpable conduct of 
a party . . . was a legal cause of less than the entire damages for 
which the plaintiff seeks recovery’ and those less-than-entire 
damages are calculable.”200 This broader interpretation for what 
constitutes a reasonable basis for apportionment is “significantly 
friendlier to PRPs” seeking to limit joint and several liability 
through a showing of divisibility.201 Specifically, the Restate-
ment (Third)’s apportionment provisions are friendlier to PRPs 
asserting divisibility defenses because it employs a two-step pro-
cess that first divides damages by causation into indivisible com-
ponent parts, and second, apportions liability for each compo-
nent according to principles of comparative responsibility.202 In 
contrast, the Restatement (Second)’s apportionment provisions 
simply divide damages by causation principles because those 
rules were developed before states started to adopt comparative 
responsibility schemes.203 
Since most Superfund sites involve a relatively complex 
harm stemming from the activities of multiple tortfeasors, it 
 
 198. See Foy, supra note 24, at 648–49 (citing Loving v. Sec’y of Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., No. 02–469V, 2009 WL 3094883, at *26 n.26 (Fed. Cl. 
July 30, 2009)). 
 199. See id. at 669. 
 200. Id. at 645 n.148 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTION-
MENT OF LIAB. § 26 (AM. LAW INST. 2000)). 
 201. Id. 
 202. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 26(a). Comparative responsibility refers to 
apportionment that includes the fault or legal responsibility of the party as at 
least one factor in the apportionment. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 
§ 487 n.1 (2d. ed., 2017) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 1). 
 203. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 26 cmt. a. 
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makes sense that bringing elements of comparative responsibil-
ity into the fold, rather than simply relying on principles of cau-
sation, will ease the burden on PRPs arguing for divisibility. Tra-
ditionally, CERCLA courts have only considered causation in 
analyzing whether harm at a given site is divisible,204 but some 
scholars have argued that courts should consider noncausation 
principles, such as common law contribution, in assessing liabil-
ity for cost recovery claims under Section 107.205 Considering 
that the Restatement (Third) reflects the vast majority of states’ 
shift away from joint and several liability in favor of some form 
of comparative responsibility,206 it would be permissible for 
courts to consider non causation principles in apportioning harm 
under CERCLA Section 107 because the Restatement (Third)’s 
apportionment framework reflects the current state of tort com-
mon law. 
In an amicus brief filed in the Fox River litigation, the Amer-
ican Tort Reform Association (ATRA) argued that the Seventh 
Circuit should have adopted the Restatement (Third) in analyz-
ing whether the harm at the site was divisible.207 The court de-
clined to do so, stating that Burlington Northern required the 
Restatement (Second) to be used in analyzing divisibility, and 
that such a departure from precedent based on a “policy argu-
ment” would be “best directed to Congress.”208 However, because 
Congress intended for liability under CERCLA Section 107 to be 
governed by evolving principles of common law, the courts have 
a permissible route to apply a contemporary analytical frame-
work that furthers the policy that “no party should be liable for 
harm it did not cause, and an injury caused by two or more per-
sons should be apportioned” according to their causal shares.209 
 
 204. See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 
599, 614 (2009). 
 205. See Pidot & Ratliff, supra note 196, at 260–61 (arguing that PRP cost 
recovery claims, contrasted with government-initiated cost recovery claims, 
“should be governed by common law contribution principles”); see also Kilbert, 
supra note 127, at 1071–77 (arguing for an analysis of equitable factors in de-
termining liability in PRP cost recovery claims). 
 206. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), intro. (“[A]ll but four states and the District of 
Columbia have adopted comparative responsibility. That change raised a host 
of new issues, which are the subject of this Restatement.”). 
 207. See ATRA Amicus Brief, supra note 188, at *3–11. 
 208. United States v. NCR Corp., 688 F.3d 833, 838 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 209. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 26 cmt. a; 7th Circuit Declines to Apply 
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III.  COURTS SHOULD ADOPT THE RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS IN ANALYZING DIVISIBILITY TO 
EFFECTUATE LEGISLATIVE INTENT   
By analyzing the apportionment issue under the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, the Burlington Northern court “reiter-
ated the status quo,”210 while recognizing “that ‘traditional and 
evolving principles of common law’ control the scope of liability 
under CERCLA.”211 Thus, rather than automatically applying 
the analytical framework outlined in the Restatement (Second), 
courts should look to the current state of tort common law in 
choosing an analytical framework for divisibility.212 As discussed 
above, the vast majority of states have moved away from joint 
and several liability in favor of comparative responsibility 
schemes that allow for a more equitable apportionment of liabil-
ity tied to the party’s culpability, and this shift is reflected in the 
Restatement (Third).213 In analyzing divisibility defenses under 
CERCLA, courts should apply the Restatement (Third) because 
of the widespread trend of states moving away from the rule of 
joint and several liability and because applying the Restatement 
(Third) is supported by several policy arguments. 
The Chem-Dyne court was the first to consider the appropri-
ate standard for liability under CERCLA cost recovery claims.214 
In making that inquiry, the court turned to the legislative his-
tory of CERCLA and observed from both the House and Senate 
proceedings that liability under Section 107 was meant to be gov-
erned by “evolving principles of common law,” rather than ap-
plying a joint and several liability standard across the board.215 
All post-Chem-Dyne decisions have applied the Restatement 
(Second) in analyzing divisibility of harm216 but that is because 
 
 210. Wetmore, supra note 132, at 43. 
 211. Foy, supra note 24, at 651 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. 
v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 613 (2009)). 
 212. Id. at 668 (“[C]ourts should not read [Burlington Northern] to require 
blind adherence to the apportionment principles of the Restatement (Second). 
Instead, courts presented with CERCLA-related divisibility questions must vig-
ilantly track developments in liability-apportionment jurisprudence, and up-
date their standards to reflect these developments.”). 
 213. See supra Parts II.B and II.C; see also Kilbert, supra note 127, at 1073. 
 214. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 215. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 807–08 (S.D. Ohio 
1983). 
 216. E.g., Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 614 (“Following Chem-Dyne, the Courts 
of Appeals have acknowledged that ‘the universal starting point for divisibility 
of harm analyses in CERCLA cases’ is § 433A of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts.”). 
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the Restatement (Second) had, for the most part, best-reflected 
the state of tort common law. In 1983, at the time of the Chem-
Dyne decision, most states followed a rule of contributory negli-
gence, whereby a plaintiff’s own negligence would bar any recov-
ery.217 This rule is reflected in the Restatement (Second)’s appor-
tionment provisions and as applied to divisibility of harm, makes 
it extremely difficult for PRPs to limit their liability on the basis 
of divisibility, even where those PRPs don’t contribute to a sub-
stantial portion of the contamination.218 
However, beginning in the late 1980s, many states moved to 
comparative responsibility schemes that are reflected in the Re-
statement (Third)’s provisions regarding apportionment of lia-
bility.219 In contrast to contributory negligence schemes, compar-
ative responsibility schemes dictate that a plaintiff’s negligence 
is simply a factor that can reduce that plaintiff’s recovery, rather 
than serving as a complete bar.220 Applied to divisibility of harm, 
the Restatement (Third)’s apportionment provisions give defend-
ants a more flexible framework within which they can argue that 
the harm at a given Superfund site is divisible. This is achieved 
by considering noncausation factors, like fault or other equitable 
principles, in addition to causation, in determining whether ap-
portionment is appropriate for a particular defendant.221 Given 
that Congress indicated that CERCLA liability was meant to be 
determined under evolving principles of common law, it is per-
missible for courts to adopt the Restatement (Third) in analyzing 
apportionment of harm because it reflects the current state of 
tort common law more accurately than the Restatement (Second) 
does.  
The adoption of the Restatement (Third) is further sup-
ported by several policy arguments. First, because CERCLA 
doesn’t influence current behavior,222 applying a more liberal ap-
portionment framework would not necessarily incentivize PRPs 
 
 217. See Kilbert, supra note 127, at 1073. 
 218. See supra Part II.A, notes 93–95 and accompanying text.  
 219. See Kilbert, supra note 127, at 1073; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 26 (AM. LAW INST. 2000); AM. TORT REFORM 
ASS’N supra note 192, at 4–12. 
 220. See Kilbert, supra note 127, at 1073. 
 221. See supra notes 200–03 and accompanying text. 
 222. CERCLA is focused on liability for contamination that has already oc-
curred, whereas liability relating to current management practices involving 
hazardous substances falls under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2012). See also Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA) Laws and Regulations, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/rcra 
(last visited Oct. 31, 2018). 
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to behave badly.223 The Resource Conservation Recovery Act 
(RCRA) has its own provisions for “corrective action” that man-
date the cleanup procedures for mismanagement of hazardous 
waste.224 Thus any deterrence factor for would-be-polluters 
would be coming from RCRA, not CERCLA, and updating the 
analytical standard for divisibility is not likely to result in more 
pollution. 
Second, “[b]y encouraging apportionment, the Restatement 
(Third) mirrors the broader trend away from joint and several 
liability,”225 which can be attributed in part “to the biased tar-
geting of deep-pocketed defendants that tends to accompany 
joint and several liability.”226 This biased targeting is analogous 
to EPA’s cost-recovery practices whereby EPA focuses on a few 
financially viable PRPs to bear the entire financial burden of the 
government’s remediation and/or removal costs.227 EPA focuses 
on financially viable PRPs to shoulder the cost of cleanup even 
where those PRPs are not responsible for a substantial portion 
of the contamination at issue, or are tangentially related to the 
site in question. 
In some cases it might be fair for a PRP to bear the entire 
financial burden of remediating a Superfund site, for example, 
when that PRP is directly responsible for a substantial portion 
of the hazardous waste contamination. However, where PRPs 
only cause discrete, calculable proportions of the contamination 
or are being sued by EPA because of their status as a current site 
owner, they should not be held financially responsible for more 
than their fair share. A more liberal apportionment framework 
gives such PRPs a better opportunity to prove that the harm is 
divisible. 
 
 223. Jerry Taylor, Hazardous Waste Landfills and Superfund, CATO INST. 
(June 22, 1995), https://www.cato.org/publications/congressional-testimony/ 
hazardous-waste-landfills-superfund. 
 224. See RCRA Corrective Action Cleanup Enforcement, EPA, https://www 
.epa.gov/enforcement/rcra-corrective-action-cleanup-enforcement (last visited 
Oct. 31, 2018). 
 225. Foy, supra note 24, at 648 n.172 (citing Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Asbestos 
Litigation and Bankruptcy: A Case Study for Ad Hoc Public Policy Limitations 
on Joint and Several Liability, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 203, 213–15 (2003)). 
 226. Id. (citing Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort Reforms’ Winners and Losers: The 
Competing Effects of Care and Activity Levels, 55 UCLA L. REV. 905, 920 (2008)). 
 227. Id. (citing Jason E. Panzer, Apportioning CERCLA Liability: Cost Re-
covery or Contribution, Where Does a PRP Stand?, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 437, 
451 (1996)). 
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Burlington Northern is an excellent example of how EPA 
sought to recover all of their cleanup costs from a financially vi-
able PRP that was not responsible for a substantial portion of 
the contamination. Despite the Railroads prevailing in their di-
visibility defense using the more stringent principles of the Re-
statement (Second), the district court found that there was a rea-
sonable basis for apportionment of harm and calculated the 
Railroads’ contribution to the contamination at the Arvin Super-
fund Site using geographic, temporal, and volumetric/toxicity 
variables.228 In upholding the district court’s apportionment cal-
culations, the Supreme Court let the government, and by exten-
sion, the taxpayers, shoulder the remaining ninety-one percent 
orphan share that should have been paid by the actual polluter 
at the site—B & B.229 
Thus, where a defendant can prove divisibility of harm, it is 
appropriate for the government to foot the bill for the remaining 
costs that can be attributed to defunct parties, even where the 
defendant asserting divisibility does have some connection to the 
contamination in question.230 In adopting the Restatement 
(Third) for analyzing divisibility defenses, courts would be giving 
less-culpable PRPs a better chance at mitigating potential joint 
and several liability because the Restatement (Third) is a more 
defendant-friendly approach to analyzing apportionment of 
harm. As discussed above, this analytical shift is overdue, given 
the prevalence of state comparative negligence schemes that are 
reflected in the more liberal apportionment framework of the Re-
statement (Third). 
There is a legitimate counterargument that easing the bur-
den on PRPs who assert divisibility defenses would result in the 
government (and by extension, the taxpayers) picking up the re-
maining portion of the cleanup bill. This is exactly what hap-
pened in Burlington Northern, as the Court forced the govern-
ment to absorb approximately ninety-one percent of the cleanup 
costs at the Arvin Superfund Site. While the “polluter-pays” 
principle makes sense when the PRP in question was the party 
directly responsible for a substantial portion of the contamina-
tion, it is less fair when a company has complete turnover of its 
 
 228. See supra notes 105–28 and accompanying text. 
 229. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 230. See generally Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 
U.S. 599 (2009); Steven A. Kunzman, Supreme Court Rules Arranger Liability 
and Apportionment Under CERCLA in Burlington Northern, DIFRANCESCO, 
BATEMAN, KUNZMAN, DAVIS, LEHRER & FLAUM P.C. (Aug. 14, 2009), http:// 
newjerseylaw.net/arch/hello-world/. 
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employees, shareholders, and customers, and those individuals 
are footing the cleanup bill.231 To make “polluter-pays” true to 
its name, the government would have to identify and invoice a 
company’s employees, shareholders, and customers that existed 
at the time when the pollution occurred.232 This endeavor would 
be extremely difficult in practice, however, and opponents of this 
Note’s solution may argue that a company in its current state, 
even if it is less culpable than its corporate predecessor, is the 
next best option. 
However, where the government seeks joint and several lia-
bility against a PRP who is not directly responsible for a sub-
stantial portion of the contamination because there are no sol-
vent PRPs who are more culpable, it is reasonable to allow that 
PRP to limit their liability by proving divisibility.233 In the case 
of a successful divisibility defense, it would be more equitable to 
spread the cost of the remaining orphan shares among as many 
people as possible (i.e., the taxpayers) rather than forcing a less 
culpable PRP to foot the bill for contamination they did not 
cause, simply because they are tangentially related to the site in 
question. Further, just as Medicare, unemployment insurance, 
Social Security, and other programs aimed at bettering the com-
munity at large are funded by American taxpayers, effective 
cleanup of hazardous contamination is of paramount interest for 
all individuals. Where less culpable PRPs are successful in lim-
iting their liability through divisibility defenses and there are no 
financially viable PRPs who are more culpable, it is fair to allow 
the government to pay for the remaining orphan shares because 
the community at large receives the benefit from remediated Su-
perfund sites. In light of the shift towards liability schemes that 
aim to limit a defendant’s liability according to her relative re-
sponsibility, it is less reasonable than ever before to hold PRPs 
jointly and severally liable when they are not directly responsi-
ble for a substantial portion of the contamination at issue and 
when they could potentially limit their liability by proving divis-
ibility under the Restatement (Third). 
  CONCLUSION   
Despite the fanfare in the aftermath of Burlington Northern, 
Superfund divisibility jurisprudence since the seminal Supreme 
 
 231. Taylor, supra note 223. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Exactly as the Railroads were able to do in Burlington Northern, 556 
U.S. 599.  
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Court decision has confirmed that there was not a gigantic shift 
in the law, and that apportionment of harm in CERCLA cases 
should be governed by evolving principles of common law. The 
lack of successful divisibility defenses by PRPs is likely due to a 
variety of factors, including the complexity of the contamination 
at most Superfund sites and the Restatement (Second)’s rela-
tively high burden of proving a “reasonable basis for apportion-
ment of harm.” States have also been steadily moving towards 
adopting rules which apportion liability in line with a defend-
ant’s culpability. Thus, to bring the analytical framework for 
CERCLA divisibility into the twenty-first century, courts should 
adopt the Restatement (Third)’s approach towards apportion-
ment, which is broader and friendlier towards PRPs asserting 
divisibility defenses. The adoption of a new framework is further 
supported by the fact that it would give less culpable PRPs a 
better opportunity to limit joint and several liability, a harsh 
rule that is becoming rarer as states continue to move towards 
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